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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROAD RUNNER INN, INC. and HAROLD 
M. SMITHSON, 
v. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
DOUGLAS c. MERRILL and COLLEEN 
B. MERRILL, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 16374 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action pursuant to the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act to set aside a conveyance by quit-claim deed of real property 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from Defendant 
Douglas C. Merrill to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill on the grounds 
that the conveyance lacked a fair consideration and was made 
with actual intent to hinder, delay and defraud Plaintiffs Road 
Runner Inn, Inc. and Harold M. Smithson who were creditors with 
matured claims against the Defendant Douglas C. Merrill at the 
time of the conveyance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On August 16, 1978, following a trial before the Honorable 
James s. Sawaya, Judge, the Court held that Defendant Douglas 
C. Merrill had breached a contract with Plaintiff Road Runner 
Inn, Inc., thereby damaging Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. in 
the sum of $28,300.00. The Court entered judgment on behalf 
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of Plaintiffs against Defendant Douglas C. Merrill in the amount 
of $28,300.00, plus costs and interest thereon. The Court 
further held that the conveyance of real property by Defendant 
Douglas C. Merrill to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill on April 12, 
1976, being oart of a stipulated settlement in a divorce action 
between the Defendants, was for a fair consideration and was not 
a fraudulent conveyance. The Court dismissed, no cause of action, 
Plaintiffs' claim to set aside the conveyance of real property. 
(R.44) Plaintiffs do not appeal from that portion of the Court's 
order granting judgment against Defendant Douglas C. Merrill nor 
have Defendants-Respondents taken any action to perfect a cross 
appeal on that issue. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek to have the district court's 
judgment concerning the transfer of property between the 
Defendants reversed and remanded with the instruction that the 
district court enter judgment holding the transfer of the home 
and real property between Defendants to be a fraudulent 
conveyance and therefore null and void. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 17, 1975, Defendant Douglas C. Merrill contracted 
with Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. to construct a building 
designed for commercial use on certain of Plaintiffs' property 
located within Salt Lake County. (Amended Finding of Fact No. l; 
R.61) Defendant Douglas C. Merrill was to act as a general 
contractor. Pursuant to this contract, Defendant Douglas C. 
Merrill requested several materialmen and subcontractors to 
2 
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to provide building supplies and construction services on the 
building. 
After the services were performed and building materials 
were supplied as requested by Defendant Douglas C. Merrill, the 
materialmen and subcontractors were not paid by him. The 
subcontractors and materialmen then asserted various liens and 
claims against Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. and Defendant 
Douglas C. Merrill. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 3; R. 62) The 
liens and claims asserted by these unpaid materialmen and 
subcontractors amounted to $28,300.00. 
No. 3; R. 62) 
(Amended Finding of Fact 
Under the terms of his contract with Plaintiff Road Runner 
Inn, Inc., Defendant Douglas c. Merrill was obligated to satisfy 
these unpaid claims. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 4; R.62) 
Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. requested that Defendant Douglas 
C. Merrill pay these claims and liens, which he failed to do. 
Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. thereafter paid a total of 
$28,300.00 to the unpaid materialmen and subcontractors in order 
to satisfy their claims. This amount was in excess of its 
contract price with Defendant Douglas C. Merrill. 
Finding of Fact No. 4; R.62) 
(Amended 
On February 27, 1976, Defendant Colleen B. Merrill began 
divorce proceedings against Defendant Douglas C. Merrill in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
(Amended Finding of Fact No. 5; R.62) Subsequently, on April 
12, 1976, the Defendants owned and possessed the following real 
and personal property: 
3 
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1. Real property located at 2341 Neffs Lane, Salt Lake c· 1 ty I 
Utah, valued at $38,000.00. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 4; R. 63; 
R. 44) 
2. A 1972 Ford Thunderbird automobile. (Merrill v. Merrill, 
R. 3) 
3. A 1969 Ford pickup truck. (Merrill v. Merrill, R.3) 
4. A 1973 Starfire boat. (Merrill v. Merrill, R.3) 
5. Furniture, fixtures and other personal belongings. 
On April 12, 1976, Defendant Douglas C. Merrill had liabili-
ties in excess of $28,300.00. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 7; 
R.62) His total liabilities exceeded his total assets, leaving 
him without the ability to pay his debts as they matured. 
(Amended Finding of Fact No. 12; R.63) Defendant Douglas C. 
Merrill was aware of this fact on April 12, 1976. Both Douglas 
and Colleen Merrill were aware that any claims or judgments 
against either or both of them could be satisfied by execution 
or levy against the real property. (Amended Finding of Fact Nos. 
15-16; R.62) Furthermore, both Douglas and Colleen Merrill were 
aware on April 12, 1978, that the creditors of Defendant Douglas 
c. Merrill could not satisfy their claims against him by execu-
tion or levy on their real property if the title thereto was 
solely in the name of Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. (Amended 
Finding of Fact No. 17; R.62) Nevertheless, on April 12, 1976, 
Defendant Douglas C. Merrill executed a Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement (Merrill v. Merrill, R.16,17) wherein he 
agreed that Defendant Colleen B. Merrill would be awarded (i) 
custody of the couple's minor children; (ii) the real property 
4 
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located at 2341 Neffs Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah; (iii) the Ford 
automobile; and (iv) $1,150.00 per month as alimony and child 
support. (Merrill v. Merrill, R.16,17) Pursuant to the 
stipulation, Defendant Douglas c. Merrill was (i) entitled to 
the old pick-up truck and a few personal belongings; (ii) 
required to assume and pay all debts and obligations incurred 
by the parties during their marriage; (iii) required to hold 
Defendant Colleen B. Merrill harmless on all debts and obligations; 
(iv) required to pay all attorneys fees and costs associated with 
the divorce action; and (v) required to continue in force all 
existing life insurance policies benefiting the couple's minor 
children. (Merrill v. Merrill, R.16,17) 
In accordance with the above-mentioned Stipulation, 
Defendant Douglas C. Merrill executed on the same day (April 12, 
1976) a quit-claim deed quit-claiming any and all interest he 
had in the real property located at 2341 Neffs Lane, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. (Amended Finding 
of Fact No. 9; R.63) After Defendant Douglas C. Merrill had 
quit-claimed his interest in the real property to Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill, his sole assets consisted of a 1969 Ford 
pick-up truck and personal items and clothing with a total value 
of approximately $1,000.00 to $1,200.00. (Amended Finding of 
Fact No. 10; R.63) 
The Interlocutory Decree of Divorce in the action between 
the Defendants was entered June 21, 1976. By its terms it 
approved the Stipulation signed by Defendant Douglas C. Merrill 
on April 12, 1976. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 19; R.62) 
5 
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On June 30, 1976, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against 
Defendants, alleging that the transfer of the home and real 
property from Defendant Douglas C. Merrill to Defendant Colleen 
B. Merrill lacked fair consideration and was fraudulent as to 
Plaintiffs. (R.2-4) 
On October 6, 1976, Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. made a 
motion to intervene in the divorce action between the Defendants. 
(Merrill v. Merrill, R.80) Following this motion, a written 
stipulation was entered into between Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, 
Inc. and Defendants upon which the district court ordered that 
the Judgment and Decree (Merrill v. Merrill, R.74-76) in the 
divorce action between the Defendants would not be conclusive on 
Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. as to the fairness of the 
consideration for the transfer of property approved or ordered 
by said Judgment and Decree from Defendant Douglas C. Merrill to 
Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. (Amended Finding of Fact No. 20; 
R.64; Merrill v. Merrill, R.80) 
A trial to the Court was held on Plaintiffs' Complaint on 
August 15, 1978. Thereafter, the Court held that (i) Defendant 
Douglas C. Merrill had breached his contract with Plaintiff Road 
Runner Inn, Inc. by failing to pay certain subcontractors and 
materialmen; (ii) as a result of Defendant Douglas C. Merrill's 
breach, Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. had been damaged in the 
amount of $28,300.00; (iii) Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. was 
entitled to judgment against Defendant Douglas C. Merrill in the 
amount of $28,300.00, together with interest and costs; and (ivl 
the transfer of the real property by Defendant Douglas C. Merril' 
6 
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to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill on April 12, 1976, being part 
of the settlement of the divorce action between the Defendants, 
was for a fair consideration. (Amended Conclusions of Law Nos. 
1-5; R.65) 
In this appeal Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. objects to 
the conclusion of the trial court that the stipulated property 
settlement in the divorce proceeding was a fair consideration 
for the transfer of the real property between Defendants at a 
time when Defendant Douglas C. Merrill's liabilities exceeded 
his assets and he was not able to pay his debts as they matured. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CONVEYANCE BY DEFENDANT DOUGLAS C. MERRILL 
OF HIS HOME AND REAL PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT COLLEEN B. 
MERRILL AS PART OF A STIPULATED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IN A 
DEFAULT DIVORCE ACTION WAS IN FRAUD OF CREDITOR-PLAINTIFF 
ROAD RUNNER INN, INC. 
Pursuant to a Property Settlement Agreement in a divorce 
action, Defendant Douglas C. Merrill conveyed his interest in 
real property and his automobile to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill 
while assuming all debts and obligations of the parties and 
promising to pay $1,150.00 per month in alimony and child support. 
(Merrill v. Merrill, R.16-18) In return, Defendant Douglas C. 
Merrill received a pick-up truck and a few personal belongings. 
(Merrill v. Merrill, R.16,17) 
After Defendant Douglas C. Merrill conveyed his home and 
all his real property to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill, Plaintiff 
Road Runner Inn, Inc. was unable to collect its debt against 
Defendant Douglas c. Merrill because of the worthlessness of his 
remaining property. Douglas c. Merrill received nothing of 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
equivalent value from Defendant Colleen B. Merrill in return for 
his conveyance. Therefore, Plaintiff-Appellant Road Runner Inn, 
Inc. asserts that the transfer was void for lack of fair 
consideration. 
A. A conveyance made without "fair consideration" by a 
debtor while insolvent is in fraud of his creditors. 
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, adopted by the Utah 
State Legislature in 1925, provides in part as follows: 
"Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, by a 
person who is, or will be thereby rendered, insolvent is 
fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual 
intent, if the conveyance is made or the obligation is 
incurred without a fair consideration." U.C.A. §25-1-4 
(1953). 
Under the Act, and in particular as set forth in this section, a 
creditor with a matured claim against a debtor may have a 
conveyance by that debtor set aside, in order to satisfy the 
creditor's claim against the debtor, if the debtor's conveyance 
was made without adequate consideration and at the time of the 
conveyance, the debtor was thereby rendered insolvent. By statute 
such a conveyance constitutes statutory fraud and is void and of 
no effect. 
The statute cited above, as applicable to the present action, 
sets forth the specific factors which will result in its 
application: 
1. There must be a conveyance. 
2. The actual intent of the person making the conveyance 
is irrelevant. 
3. The person making the conveyance must already be 
insolvent or rendered insolvent by the conveyance. 
8 
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4. The conveyance must lack an adequate or fair consideration 
passing from the grantee to the grantor. 
The record in this case clearly shows that all of these 
factors were present when Douglas C. Merrill conveyed his interest 
in the real property located at 2341 Neffs Lane to the Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill. 
By statute a conveyance occurs when any tangible property 
is transferred between two parties. U.C.A. §25-1-1 (1953). The 
Quit-Claim Deed executed by Douglas C. Merrill on April 12, 1976, 
which transferred his entire interest in the real property to 
Defendant Colleen B. Merrill clearly constituted a "conveyance" 
within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated, Sections 25-1-1 and 
25-1-4. A determination of the existence of a subjective intent 
on the part of Douglas C. Merrill to defraud the Plaintiff Road 
Runner Inn, Inc. is not necessary. Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 
560, 151 P.2d 99, 154 A.L.R. 906 (1944). 
A person is insolvent within the meaning of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 25-1-4, when: 
"The present fair saleable value of his assets is less than 
the amount that will be required to satisfy his probable 
liability on existing debts as they become absolute and 
matured." U.C.A. §25-1-2 (1953). 
Insolvency under the statute "is not insolvency in the bankruptcy 
sense but merely a showing that the parties' assets are not 
sufficient to meet liabilities as they become due." Meyer v. 
General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah, 1977). In 
its Amended Findings of Fact the court below found that on April 
12, 1976, the date "Douglas c. Merrill conveyed away his interest 
in the real property, his total liabilities exceeded his total 
9 
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--
assets and he was unable to pay his debts as they matured." 
(Amended Finding of Fact No. 12; R. 6 3) This finding demonstrates 
conclusively that Douglas C. Merrill was "insolvent," as that 
term is defined in the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 
when he conveyed the real property to Defendant Colleen B. 
Merrill on April 12, 1976. 
"Fair Consideration" under the Utah statutes is given for 
property conveyed between parties: 
"(1) When in exchange for such property, or obliga-
tion, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, 
property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied; or, 
"(2) When such property, or obligation, is received 
in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt 
in amount not disproportionately small when compared with 
the value of the property or obligation obtained." U.C.A. 
§25-1-3 (1953). 
The concept of "Fair Consideration" has received substantial 
attention from the courts. As a result, certain basic concepts 
about "Fair Consideration" have evolved which courts apply when 
reviewing a challenged conveyance. 
"Fair Consideration" must be determined from the standpoint 
of the credi tor--that is, whether the diminuation in the debtor's 
estate unfairly impairs the creditor's prospect of recovery or 
payment. United States v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661 (1969); 
Larrimer v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351 (1963); Ned J. 
Bowman Co. v. White, supra; Bailey v. Leeper, 142 Cal.App.2d 460, 
298 P.2d 684 (1956); Hansen v. Cramer, 39 Cal.2d 321, 245 P.2d 
1059 (1952). A debtor may be satisfied to give his property 
away or exchange it for some worthless chattel, but the statute 
will not permit him to do so "if he thereby renders himself 
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uncollectable to the detriment of his creditors." Hansen v. 
~, supra, at 1061. 
"Fair Consideration" means that a conveyance must be made 
for both a "fair equivalent" and in "good faith." Meyer v. 
General American Corp., supra, at 1096. "Fair equivalent" has 
been held to mean "such a price as a capable and diligent 
businessman could presently obtain for the property after 
conferring with those accustomed to buying such property." 
Utah Assets Corporation v. Dooley Bros., 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 
738, 742 (1937). Thus, a fair consideration exists when a 
transferee gives in return substantially the full equivalent 
value of the property in light of the prevailing circumstances. 
Lucas v. Coker, 189 Okla. 95, 113 P.2d 589 (1941). The value 
of the transferred property must be determined as of the date 
of the conveyance. Hansen v. Cramer, supra. 
Turning again to Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-1-3 (1953), 
it is apparent that Subsection (2) thereof is inapplicable to 
the case at bar. That subsection concerns itself solely with 
property given by a debtor as security for a present advance 
or antecedent debt. There is no indication in any of the lower 
court's findings that Douglas C. Merrill transferred his 
property interests as security. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-1-3(1) (1953), provides 
that "Fair Consideration" is given when (i) property is 
exchanged for equivalent property, or (ii) an antecedent debt 
of equivalent value is satisfied. An antecedent debt is any 
11 
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pre-existing, legally enforceable liability. Vinlis Construction 
Co. v. Roreck, 67 Misc.2d 942, 325 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1971); Hansenv. 
Cramer, supra. Nowhere in the trial court's findings is there 
any indication that the transfers of property made by the 
Defendant Douglas C. Merrill to the Defendant Colleen B. Merrill 
were in satisfaction of an antecedent debt owed by Douglas c. 
Merrill to Colleen B. Merrill. The only remaining basis upon 
which "Fair Consideration" can be found in the law, as defined 
by Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-1-4 (1) (1953), is that the 
Defendant Colleen E. Merrill conveyed or transferred to the 
Defendant Douglas C. Merrill, at the time she was given his entire 
interest in the real property at 2341 Neffs Lane, property having 
a fair equivalent value. 
Referring to the agreement reached between the Defendants 
for the distribution of the property held by them and the 
assumption of the parties' outstanding liabilities as of April 
12, 1976, we note that they agreed as follows: Defendant Colleen 
B. Merrill was given custody of the parties' three minor children. 
She was given Douglas C. Merrill's interest in the real proper~. 
She received a 1972 Thunderbird automobile. Defendant Douglas 
c. Merrill agreed to assume and pay all outstanding obligations 
and debts of the parties and to hold Defendant Colleen B. Merrill 
harmless thereon. He agreed to pay $1,150.00 per month to 
Defendant Colleen B. Merrill as alimony and child support. He 
also agreed to maintain any existing life insurance policies for 
the benefit of his three minor children. 
The divorce action, of which the property agreement was a 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
part, was brought and prosecuted by Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. 
The Defendant Douglas C. Merrill agreed to withdraw his answer 
filed in the divorce action so that a default judgment could be 
entered against him. These facts undeniably reveal that not only 
did Defendant Douglas C. Merrill fail to receive from Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill something of equivalent value in consideration 
for the transfer of his real property to her, he failed to 
receive anything at all. In addition, he agreed to personally 
assume all of the debts of the parties (including all obligations 
on the real property) and he released Defendant Colleen B. 
Merrill from any obligation on those debts. He kept only a 1969 
pick-up truck and minimal personal belongings but agreed to 
assume all the parties' debts and to pay substantial alimony, 
child support and insurance obligations. All this was agreed 
upon by the Defendants at a time when Douglas C. Merrill was 
insolvent and owed Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. $28,300.00. 
Such circumstances clearly establish that "Fair Consideration," 
as traditionally defined and understood under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 25-1-3 (1) (1953), was not given by Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill in return for the property she received from 
Defendant Douglas c. Merrill. 
Notwithstanding these facts, the trial court concluded that 
the challenged transfer "being part of the settlement of the 
divorce action between the grantor and grantee, was for a fair 
consideration." (Amended Conclusion of Law No. 5; R.65) This 
conclusion is clearly in contravention to the law and other 
well-reasoned authority. 
13 
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B. A stipulated property settlement agreement in a divo1:3 
action is not "Fair Consideration" for the transfer of a debtor's 
property within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-1-
---: 
(1953). 
The lower court's holding that settlement of a divorce actio: 
alone can constitute adequate consideration for a conveyance 
between husband and wife is, when viewed in the light of other 
court decisions, clearly erroneous. While no case has been found 
by Plaintiffs which specifically holds a conveyance to be 
fraudulent under facts identical to those in the case at bar, a 
number of courts have reviewed the question of validity of 
conveyances between spouses when marriage or divorce is raised 
as consideration for the transfer. In each instance, however, 
the courts have insisted on something more than the marriage 
relationship or a divorce to sustain a finding of "Fair 
Consideration." 
Before reviewing those cases dealing with transfers between 
spouses, the Court must keep in mind that any conveyance between 
relatives is subject to rigid scrutiny. Smith v. Popham, 513 
P.2d 1172 (Ore., 1973); Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 Utah 2d 
173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962); Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 
P.2d 959 (1960); Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P.2d 
135 (1948). This is especially true where a transfer of proper~ 
is between husband and wife. McLaughlin, Application of the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 404, 428 
(1933). This rule has been adopted in almost every jurisdiction 
because the state courts have recognized "the notorious tendenc 
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of spouses to aid each other in enjoying secretly reserved 
property interests and to be generous to each other before they 
are just to creditors." McLaughlin, supra, at 428. 
Under principles long developed through the Statute of 
Elizabeth, a transfer for which the consideration is support of 
the grantor is invalid, not only because it is an executory 
promise (Crain v. Gould, 46 Ill. 293 (1867)), but also because 
the consideration is of no value to creditors. McLaughlin, 
supra, at 418. Transfers which claim as their consideration 
the performance by a wife of her ordinary marital or household 
duties or even the performance of past services other than usual 
household duties lack sufficient consideration so as to avoid 
the claims of creditors. 
§77 at 759. 
37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances, 
It has been held that the promise of future support and 
the waiver of all claims for future support do not constitute 
"Fair Consideration" for transfers of property. Both types of 
consideration are of no value to creditors, for a creditor cannot 
levy or execute on a promise or a waiver of a right. In the 
case of Detroit Security Trust Co. v. Gitre, 254 Mich. 66, 235 
N.W. 884 (1931), the defendant transferred his property to his 
son in trust for the support of his wife. The defendant's wife 
executed a consent to the instrument whereby she waived all of 
her claims for dower, alimony and support. After the plaintiff-
creditor challenged the conveyance, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
found that the agreement of the son to support his mother did not 
furnish a consideration for the transfer which would defeat a 
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creditor's claim. In Auburgh v. Lydston, 117 Ill. App. 574 o 90 i 
the husband transferred all his property to his wife when he a~ 
his wife separated in return for her waiver of all claims for 
support. As to creditors, it was held that the transfer was 
without a fair consideration. 
In the case at bar, not only did Defendant Douglas C. Merrili 
transfer all of his property to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill, ~t 
he also agreed to pay her alimony and child support and pay all 
of her outstanding obligations and debts as well. If a waiver by 
the wife of claims for support is inadequate consideration, an 
agreement by Defendant Douglas C. Merrill to pay support, alimony 
and outstanding debts can hardly be termed adequate or "Fair 
Consideration." In National Surety Co. v. Wittich, 184 Minn. 44, 
237 N.W. 690 (1931), the defendant conveyed his property to his 
wife in an attempt to appease her ire aroused by his indiscretions ' 
with a younger woman. In return for the property, the wife agreed 1 
to continue to live with the defendant. The Minnesota court 
determined that the transfer lacked consideration and was void as 
to creditors. 
In First National Bank of Fairbanks v. Enzler, 537 P.2d 517 
(Alaska, 1975), the defendant husband engaged in numerous 
unsuccessful business ventures which substantially depleted the 
family savings. As a result of the defendant's financial 
ineptitude, his wife threatened divorce if the defendant did not 
sign over all his interest in their assets to her so that she 
would have complete control of the family's remaining property. 
Following the transfer, the defendant continued to live with thf 
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family and operate the family business as before. Several months 
later the defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy which resulted 
in a challenge by the trustee in bankruptcy to the validity of 
the transfers from the defendant to his wife. on appeal the 
Enzlers argued that the conveyance was supported by consideration 
in the form of the wife's forebearance in a divorce action against 
the defendant husband. However, the Supreme Court of Alaska 
disagreed with the Enzlers and found that "Fair Consideration" 
was lacking. The Alaskan court based its decision on an earlier 
Wisconsin opinion, Oppenheimer v. Collins, 115 Wis. 283, 91 N.W. 
690 (1902). In that case creditors attacked a conveyance from 
Mr. Collins to Mrs. Collins of the farmer's interest in an 
inheritance for the sole consideration of the withdrawal by Mrs. 
Collins of a divorce action and her consent to continue the 
marriage. While recognizing that the wife had valid grounds for 
a divorce, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the transfer 
was without sufficient consideration. The Court reasoned as 
follows: 
"The first of these reasons is that neither the law nor 
public policy can favor or approve bargaining between 
husband and wife as to continuance or severance of the 
marital status, in the existence of which the public, as a 
third party, is interested, as well as the two spouses .•. 
Another most cogent reason is the utter inability to protect 
the rights of creditors in the property of a husband if such 
contracts can be deemed a valid consideration. Apparently 
the present case presents as nearly a meritorious situation 
for pecuniary arrangement between husband and wife as any 
likely to arise; but, if the principle be established that 
merely continuing the marital relation is a sufficient 
consideration to support conveyance from husband to wife 
against creditors, there will be no difficulty in supporting 
such conveyances even in most flagrant cases. It would but 
be necessary to establish any reasonable degree of exasperating 
circumstances or of conjugal infelicity to enable an insolvent 
husband to place his property within the shelter of his wife's 
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name, because, forsooth, she condones his alleged misconduct· 
which, for the purpose of effectuating a fraudulent scheme ' 
he may well be willing to admit." 91 N.W. at 691, 692. ' 
The reasoning of these cases is clear--a transfer between 
spouses, the consideration for which is the settlement of an 
action for divorce, cannot be "Fair Consideration" with regard 
to creditors' claims. 
When a debtor places his property beyond the reach of a 
creditor, the debtor must receive a valuable and fair considerati~ 
in return for the transfer in order that the creditor's claims 
remain meaningful. U.C.A. §25-1-4 (1953). If a promise to 
forebear in or settle a divorce action is to be viewed as fair 
consideration, a creditor's claim becomes meaningless because a 
creditor cannot levy or execute on such consideration. Keeping 
in mind that the purpose of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
is not to prevent a creditor from collecting his honest accoun~, 
Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, supra, at 964, the courts have found 
this lack of consideration to be vulnerable to a creditor's attack. 
Appellants note that there are several cases indicating that, 
as between spouses, one spouse's forebearance in pursuing a 
meritorious divorce action will be valid consideration for a 
transfer of property from the other spouse. However, these cases 
are distinguished by the fact that only the spouses were involved 
and the transfers were not challenged by creditors. Holsomback 
v. Caldwell, 218 Ga. 393, 128 S.E.2d 47 (1962); Campbell v. 
Prater, 64 Wyo. 293, 191 P.2d 160 (1948); Mack v. Mack, 87 Neb. 
819, 128 N.W. 527 (1960); Duffy v. White, 115 Mich. 264, 73 N.W. 
363 (1897). An agreement, particularly a potentially collusive 
one, may be binding intra parietes without binding third parties. 
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Notwithstanding the above authority, the trial court 
erroneously concluded that a settlement of a divorce action is, 
in fact, "Fair Consideration" as against third party creditors, 
a conclusion which clearly contravenes the principles of law 
expounded above. 
That the settlement of a divorce action alone will not act 
as consideration for a transfer is evident from the Florida case 
of Liberman v. Kelso, 354 So.2d 137 (Fla. App., 1978). In 
Liberman the defendant Kelso's husband had transferred to the 
defendant his entire interest in the parties' marital home. This 
transfer was made pursuant to a property settlement agreement in 
a divorce action brought by the defendant which was later 
approved by the court and incorporated into the final judgment 
of dissolution. This conveyance was challenged by the husband's 
creditors. 
On appeal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, the 
Court found that fair consideration had accompanied the transfer 
of the home not because the conveyance was part of a divorce 
settlement, but because "the settlement agreement required (Kelso) 
to convey her interest in certain other property to the husband." 
354 So.2d at 139. 
Liberman illustrates that when one party transfers property 
and receives property of a fair equivalent from the transferee, 
a creditor cannot complain about the transfer. This rule applies 
equally to transfers between strangers, as well as to transfers 
between a husband and wife in the settlement of a divorce action. 
In Liberman the wife gave up valuable property in exchange for 
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the conveyance of property from the husband. The fairness of ~e 
consideration rested on the equivalent exchange of property 
between husband and wife and not on the fact that the transfer 
was made pursuant to a property settlement in a divorce suit. 
Neither the Florida court nor any other court Plaintiff-Appellant 
Road Runner Inn, Inc. has been able to discover has found fairnes, 
of consideration flowing solely from a property settlement 
agreement itself. 
A property settlement agreement establishes only the manner 
in which the assets and liabilities of the married couple are to 
be divided upon divorce. Where it provides for an equal di vision 
of property among the parties, the actual and equal splitting of 
property, the exchange of property for its fair equivalent, 
constitutes a fair consideration which validates the transfer. 
This is the clear rule of Liberman. However, if the settlement 
agreement does not provide for an exchange of property for its 
fair equivalent, neither the settlement agreement itself nor the 
actual division of property between the parties can amount to a 
fair consideration sufficient to defeat a creditor's challenge. 
In that situation the rights of the creditor are unprotected and 
become worthless because of the inadequacy or total lack of 
consideration, a result contrary both to sound public policy and 
the statutory law of this state. Such a transfer is fraudulent 
and cannot be upheld as to creditors. This is precisely the case 
before this Court. 
Defendant Colleen B. Merrill brought a divorce action agains' 
Defendant Douglas C. Merrill. He agreed to a property settlement 
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wherein he gave the Defendant Colleen B. Merrill his interest 
in the couple's real property, an automobile, custody of the 
couple's children, $1,150.00 per month in child support and 
alimony, the continued protection of life insurance and a release 
from any and all obligations and debts accrued by the couple 
during their marriage. In return for his generosity, Defendant 
Douglas C. Merrill took an almost worthless nine-year-old pick-up 
truck and a few personal belongings. The lack of 'Fair Consideration' 
accompanying Douglas C. Merrill's conveyance, as defined by Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 25-1-3 (1953), and as illustrated above, 
is obvious. Nothing of a value equivalent to the real property, 
automobile, release from debts and obligations and rights to 
payment of child support and alimony was given by Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill to Defendant Douglas C. Merrill in return. 
Because this transfer lacked "Fair Consideration" and because 
Defendant Douglas C. Merrill was insolvent at the time it 
occurred, the conveyance was in fraud of Plaintiff Road Runner 
Inn, Inc. and the decision of the trial court to the contrary 
must be reversed. 
POINT II. THE CONVEYANCE BY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT DOUGLAS 
C. MERRILL OF HIS REAL PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
COLLEEN B. MERRILL WAS MADE WITH THE ACTUAL INTENT TO HINDER, 
DELAY OR DEFRAUD PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT ROAD RUNNER INN, INC. 
Chapter 1, Title 25, of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
provides that a transfer made with the actual intent to defraud 
creditors is void, regardless of whether adequate or fair 
consideration is received. Specifically, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 25-1-7 (1953), states: 
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"Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred · 
t 1 . t d. . . ' Wlth ac ua in.ent, as istinguished from intent presumed in 
law, .to hi~der, delay or defraud either present or future 
creditors is fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors." 
This section makes a conveyance void not only if it is made with 
an intent to defraud the creditors of the granter, but also if 
made with an intent to hinder or delay them. Ned J. Bowman Co. 
v. White, supra. Any conveyance will violate Section 25-1-7 if 
the actual intent of the transferor, at the time the conveyance 
is made, is to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors. Neubauer 
v. Cloritier, 265 Minn. 539, 122 N.W.2d 623 (1963). 
The courts have held that actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud creditors may be shown in any one of three ways. Actual 
fraudulent intent is established (i) where a debtor transfers 
property in a manner that will necessarily result in hindering, 
delaying or defrauding creditors; (ii) where an insolvent debtor 
transfers property for a nominal consideration; or (iii) where 
the transfer is surrounded by numerous "badges of fraud." The 
findings of the lower court clearly indicate that the Defendant 
Douglas C. Merrill intended to hinder, delay and defraud the 
Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. when he conveyed all of his 
property to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. 
A. Actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors is 
proven if a debtor transfers property under circumstances which 
must necessarily result in hindering or defrauding creditors. 
The courts have long held that an individual is deemed to 
intend the probable and reasonable consequences of his own actions. 
This rule applies equally in determining the intent of a grantor 
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when trasnferring his own property. Smith v. Clark, 242 Mass. 
1, 136 N.E. 66 (1922). Thus, if a conveyance of property "is 
made under such circumstances that the result must necessarily 
be to hinder and delay creditors, it will be presumed that this 
was the intent of the transferor in making it." 37 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Fraudulent Conveyances, §8, p.698. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court stated in Evans v. Cheatham, 183 
Ark. 82, 34 S.W.2d 1076 (1931): 
"[I]t is well settled that fraud may arise as an inference 
of law, and that, when a conveyance is made under such 
circumstances that the result must necessarily be to hinder 
and delay creditors, it will be presumed that such was the 
intent of the transferor in making it." 34 S.W.2d at 1077. 
See, also, Rice v. Columbia, 143 S.C. 516, 141 S.E. 705 (1928); 
Fahey v. Fahey, 43 Colo. 354, 96 P. 251 (1908); Hoppe Hardware 
Co. v. Bain, 21 Okla. 177, 95 P. 765 (1908). If a person conveys 
away property in a manner that will cause his creditors to be 
hindered, delayed or defrauded .in the collection of their honest 
debts, it must be presumed that the transferor's intent in making 
the conveyance was to cause such hindrance or defrauding. Such 
is the case in the appeal before this Court. 
As part of its Amended Findings of Fact, the trial court 
found that the Defendants were aware that any judgment against 
either or both of them could be satisfied by execution or levy 
against the real property they owned. (Amended Finding of Fact 
No. 15; R.64) That to forestall execution or levy on previous 
occasions, the Defendants had arranged loans from financial 
institutions and relatives in order to satisfy judgments and 
obligations outstanding against them. (Amended Finding of Fact 
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No. 13; R.63) Furthermore, the trial court specifically found 
that on April 12, 1976, the date of the challenged transfer, t~ 
Defendants knew that the creditors of Defendant Douglas c. Merrill 
could not satisfy their claims against him by execution or levy 
on the real property owned by him if title thereto was only in 
the name of Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. (Amended Finding of 
Fact No. 17; R.64) The Amended Findings of Fact clearly reveal 
that the Defendants knew Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. could 
not collect the obligation Defendant Douglas C. Merrill owed it 
if he transferred his entire interest in his real property to 
Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. Nonetheless, in the glaring light 
of this realization, Defendants engaged in a transfer of property 
which had the unquestionable consequence of hindering, delaying 
and defrauding Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. These facts 
unerringly establish the actual intent of Defendants to hinder, 
delay or defraud Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. 
B. Actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors is 
established where an insolvent transferor conveys away his 
property without receiving a fair consideration in return. 
In Brimhall v. Grow, 25 Utah 2d 298, 480 P.2d 731 (1971), 
the plaintiff State Commissioner of Financial Institutions brought 
suit challenging certain transfers of property by the defendants 
therein as fraudulent conveyances. One defendant, Spencer Grow, 
had borrowed substantial amounts of money from a savings and loan 
business and secured those loans with liens on real property. 
When Grow defaulted on the loans, plaintiff foreclosed on the 
real propert~ only to discover that the amount of the loans 
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exceeded the fair market value of the property. In order to 
collect the deficiency, plaintiff brought action challenging 
certain transfers by Grow to his son, Steven Grow. 
At trial the plaintiff alleged that the transfers from the 
father to his son were invalid under Utah Code Annotated, Section 
25-1-8 (1953), which by its terms voids "Every conveyance 
of any estate or interest in lands .•. made with the intent to 
delay, hinder or defraud creditors ... After the trial court 
found that the conveyances from Spencer Grow to his son, Steven, 
were accompanied only by nominal consideration and that he was 
insolvent at the time of the execution of the conveyances, this 
Court held that "under Section 25-1-8, u.c.A. I 1953, proof of 
these facts constituted a prima facie case." 480 P.2d at 734. 
Under Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-1-8 (1953), intent 
can be established by showing that an insolvent debtor transferred 
away his property without receiving a fair consideration from the 
transferee. Sections 25-1-8 and 25-1-7 are similar in that both 
require proof of an intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors 
in order to invalidate a conveyance of property. Plaintiff-
Appellant Road Runner Inn, Inc. contends that the method for 
establishing intent under Section 25-1-8 should apply equally to 
cases arising under Section 25-1-7. Therefore, by proving that 
the conveyance from Defendant Douglas C. Merrill to Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill lacked fair consideration and was made at a 
time when Defendant Douglas c. Merrill was insolvent, Plaintiff 
Road Runner Inn, Inc. also established Defendants' actual intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. in 
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--
the collection of its lawful accounts in violation of Section 
25-1-7. 
C. Actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors is 
proven if a conveyance is surrounded by a substantial number of 
recognized "badges of fraud." 
The actual fraudulent intent of a transferor in making a 
conveyance may be determined by an examination of the circumstances 
surrounding the conveyance. Matter of Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 
587 (Wyo. 1977); Continental Bank v. Marcus, Penn. , 36 3 
A.2d 1318 (1976); Brydges v. Emmendorfer, 311 Mich. 274, 18 
N.W.2d 822 (1945); Farrell v. Paulus, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N.W.2d 
700 (1944); Cardon v. Harper, supra. Specifically, "actual intent" 
to hinder, dealy or defraud creditors, within the meaning of Ut~ 
Code Annotated, Section 25-1-7 (1953), 
exposing a number of "badges of fraud" 
may be established by I 
which accompany a fraudulent ! 
conveyance. As was stated by the Wyoming court in Matter of 
Estate of Reed, supra: 
"The issue of actual fraud is commonly determined by 
recognized indicia, demonstrated badges of fraud, which are 
circumstances so frequently attending fraud; a concurrence 
of several will make out a strong case and be the 
circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a court's 
finding." 566 P.2d at 591. 
See, also, United States v. Bertie, 529 F.2d 506 (9th Cir., 1976); 
Mohar v. McLelland Lumber Co., 95 Idaho 38, 501 P.2d 722 (1972); 
Gafco, Inc. v. H.D.S. Mercantile Corp., 47 Misc.2d 661, 263 
N.Y.S.2d 109 (1965). While a single "badge of fraud" may stamp 
a transaction as fraudulent (Payne v. Gilmore, Okla. __ , 
382 P.2d 140 (1963)), when several "badges of fraud" are found 
in combination, the transferor must bring forth strong and clear 
I 26 
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evidence to repel the conclusion of fraud. Springfield Ins. Co. 
~, 267 F. Supp. 693 (D.C. Okla., 1967); Burns v. Radoicich, 
77 C.A.2d 697, 176 P.2d 77 (1947). 
The leading case of Evans v. Trude, 193 Ore. 648, 240 P.2d 
940 (1952), sets forth in some detail the long recognized "badges 
of fraud:" 
1. Inadequate consideration in return for the transfer of 
property. 
2. Transfer of property in anticipation of pending 
litigation. 
3. Insolvency of the transferor. 
4. Failure to record the instrument signifying the transfer 
within a reasonable length of time after execution without 
explanation for the delay. 
5. The conveyance covers all or substantially all of the 
debtor's property. 
6. Retention of possession of the property by the grantor 
after the date of the conveyance. 
7. The conveyance so depletes the assets of the transferor 
as to thereby hinder and delay creditors. 
8. The close relationship of the parties to the conveyance. 
These long recognized badges of fraud are as clearly apparent 
in this case as they are multitudinous. A review of the trial 
court's findings indicates the following: 
1. The transfer of the home and real property from Defendant 
Douglas c. Merrill to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill was made 
without a fair consideration as defined by Utah Code Annotated, 
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Section 25-1-4 (1953. 
2. The transfer of the real property was in anticipation 
of a pending suit. Other lawsuits by creditors were imminent or 
had already been filed. 
3. The Defendant Douglas C. Merrill was insolvent at the 
time of the conveyance. 
4. The conveyance was a transfer of all of Defendant 
Douglas c. Merrill's assets of any pecuniary value. 
5. The transfer completely stripped Defendant Douglas C. 
Merrill of all valuable assets so as to necessarily hinder and 
delay Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. in the recovery of any part 
of its judgment. 
6. The relationship of the transferee and transferor was 
that of husband and wife. 
7. The Defendants both knew that creditors would be hinderec 
and delayed in the collection of their accounts when Douglas C. 
Merrill executed the conveyance. 
In addition to the above factors, a hurried transaction, not 
in the usual mode of doing business, is also considered a badge 
of fraud. United States v. Leggett, 292 F.2d 423 (6th Cir., 19611, 
cert. den. 368 U.S. 914, 82 S.Ct. 194, 7 L.Ed.2d 131, reh. den. 
368 U.S. 979, 82 S.Ct. 476, 7 L.Ed.2d 441. The Defendants in 
this cause signed the Property Settlement Agreement in the divorce i 
action on April 12, 1976. On that same day Douglas C. Merrill 
quit-claimed his entire interest in the real property to Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill rather than waiting until the Decree of Divor~ j 
I 
was entered on June 21, 1976. 
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Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. has previously shown that 
only two of the "badges of fraud," (i) insolvency of the 
transferor and (ii) lack of a fair consideration, lead to a 
determination by statute of actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud creditors. However, when coupled with the additional 
badges of fraud set forth above, the undeniable conclusion is 
that Defendant Douglas C. Merrill transferred his real property 
to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill with the actual intent to hinder, 
delay and defraud Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. in the 
collection of its honest and lawful accounts. 
By any one of the three methods of examination outlined 
above, this Court can and must determine that the transfer of 
the real property from Defendant Douglas C. Merrill to Defendant 
Colleen B. Merrill was made with the actual intent to hinder, 
delay and ultimately defraud Defendant Douglas C. Merrill's 
creditors. Having concluded that Douglas C. Merrill's actual 
intent was to defraud his creditors, the elements of Section 
25-1-7 are established and the transfer of the Defendant Douglas 
C. Merrill's real property must be held null and void as to the 
creditors of Douglas C. Merrill. 
CONCLUSION 
On October 6, 1976, an Order of the Court in the divorce 
proceeding between the Defendants affirmed the stipulation of 
Defendant Colleen B. Merrill that the Judgment and Decree in the 
divorce proceeding was not conclusive on Plaintiff Road Runner 
Inn, Inc. as to the fairness of consideration for the challenged 
transfer. By way of this action, Plaintiff challenges the fairness 
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of consideration for the transfer of Defendant Douglas c. Merrill': 
home and real property to Defendant Colleen B. Merrill. Plaintiif, 
have clearly and explicitly established that fair consideration 
was not given by Defendant Colleen B. Merrill for the Defendants' 
home and real property. U.C.A. §25-1-3 (1953). Because Defendan: 
Douglas C. Merrill made this transfer at a time when he was 
insolvent and received no fair consideration in return, the 
conveyance was void as to Defendants' creditors. U.C.A. §25-1-4 
(1953). 
In addition to the lack of consideration and insolvency of 
the transferor, the Defendants' actual intent in making the 
conveyance was to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff Road Runner 
Inn, Inc. With such a fraudulent intent, the transfer must also 
be avoided as being in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 
25-1-7 (1953). 
Because the challenged transfer is invalid under at least 
two statutory provisions, the decision of the lower court must 
be reversed and the lower court must be directed and ordered to 
hold the transfer of the Defendants' home and real property null 
and void as to Plaintiff Road Runner Inn, Inc. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 1979. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Appellants' Brief by hand delivering 
two copies to the following: 
Roger S. Blaylock, Esq. 
MORRIS AND BLAYLOCK 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent Douglas C. Merrill 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dale R. Kent, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Colleen B. Merrill 
660 South 2d East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this 7th day of June, 1979. 
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